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NOTES
MEASURE OF DAMAGE FOR BREACH OF MORTGAGEE COMPLETION

BONDS-Trust and Finance Companies have evolved a complicated
system of financing the construction of the modern skyscraper, apartment or row of houses. It is believed that only those members of
the bar who specialize in real estate law are generally familiar with
the method in vogue for financing so-called "building operations."
There are almost as many variations in the scheme of financing as
there are institutions which engage in the business.
A Typical Financing Plan.
A builder owns or buys a piece of land upon which he wishes
to erect a building for the purpose of sale at a profit. His architect
prepares plans and specifications and the builder negotiates with subcontractors, obtains completion estimates, and lays his plan before a
Trust Company. Assuming the plan is approved as the basis of a
construction loan by the latter, the following steps are taken.
The builder organizes two corporations which we shall for convenience call Construction Company and Owning Company. He conveys the unimproved real estate to Owning Company which creates
a mortgage to the builder, as mortgagee, in an amount somewhat in
excess of the total cash required to finance the building. He, as
mortgagee, then applies to the Trust Company for a loan upon his personal note in the amount actually needed to pay commissions, fees,
premiums, and construction costs. This amount is usually about 8o
per cent. of the mortgage, which is assigned by the builder to the
Trust Company as collateral security for the note.
Before the "building operation" account is credited by the Trust
Company, that institution usually requires additional protection. The
Owning Company enters into a building contract with Construction
Company whereunder the latter undertakes to perform all the work
and supply all the materials necessary for the erection of the building. In Pennsylvania, this contract invariably contains a waiver of
the right to file mechanic's liens and is promptly recorded. Construction Company then enters into its sub-contracts. The sub-contractors
are quite customarily promised payment, about 65 per cent. in cash
and the balance in Owning Company's notes due ninety days after
completion of the building. In Pennsylvania, the sub-contractors
are bound by the principal contractor's waiver of the right to file
liens, and thus from the outset have a considerable financial interest
in the success of the project. If the building is not completed, and
sold or refinanced, the chances are they will go begging for their
35 per cent. deferred payments, as Owning Company usually has no
assets but the building. All the contracts described above provide
(202)
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for payment of contractors out of the "operation account" on vouchers
approved by either the lending Trust Company or the Surety Company mentioned hereafter. The Trust Company (for a premium)
writes a so-called "actual loss" Completion Policy to itself as oblgee.
To protect itself in the event that any of the sub-contractors default,
the Construction Company is required to obtain a surety bond running to the Trust Company as obligee. The condition of this bond
is usually that the Principal (Construction Company) shall well and
truly complete the building in accordance with the terms of the contract. Similarly, the various sub-contractors are required to obtain
completion bonds. Thereafter title to the land is conveyed by Owning Company to the Trust Company's nominee (subject to the aforesaid mortgage) who executes a declaration of trust (which is never
recorded) that he will re-convey to Owning Company or its nominee
after (i) Trust Company's loan and any further expenses have been
repaid in full, (2) the building has been fully completed and (3) all
contractors have been paid.
Not until all the above things have been accomplished is Trust
Company ready to credit the "operation account" with the amount of
the loan. At that time, an "operation agreement" is signed under
which the money is advanced only for purposes of completing the
building and is thus made safe from the builder's creditors.
Let us assume under the financial plan described above that the
principal contractor (Construction Company) defaults under its contract and abandons the work, leaving the building but partly completed. What are the rights of the Trust Company as assignee of
the mortgage and holder of the surety completion bond?
In measuring the damage suffered by a mortgagee, or by any
other plaintiff in a civil case, it is of course the duty of the jury
under proper instruction of the court to determine the actual loss
suffered as a result of the breach of the plaintiff's right. In determining this loss in cases such as the one under discussion the courts
undoubtedly will be guided by the decided cases which show the
proper measure of damage in cases where an owner, as distinguished
from a mortgagee, has suffered a loss as the result of a failure on
the part of a contractor to complete a building.
Owner-obligee.
In the case where the owner is attempting to recover for a breach
of the bond the measure of damages is in effect the same as where
the contract itself is breached,1 and the obligee should recover the
sum necessary to put him in as good condition as if the contract had
been fulfilled. 2 In theory at least this sum would seem to be the
12 SEDGWICz, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) § 679.
2 Ibid., § 3o. Blackburn, J., in Wall v. City of London R. P. Co., L. R.
9 Q. B. 249 (1874) considered it to be the pecuniary amount representing "the
difference between the present state of things, and what it would have been if
the contract had been performed."
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difference between the value of the work as done and the value which
it would have had if completed in accordance with the contract.3 As
an alternative method of stating what is theoretically the same measure
the courts quite generally use:
"the difference between the amount to be paid by the owner to
the defaulting contractor and the amount it actually and necessarily costs to complete by subsequent contract." 4
Though the wording of this rule quite naturally varies from case
to case,3 it can invariably be distinguished from the previous stated
rule in that the measure of damages is based on the "cost of completion", rather than upon the "difference in value".
It is submitted that the difference between these criteria is
merely one of evidentiary technique and that the results will tend to
be the same no matter which rule be applied. Furthermore it would
seem that any possible deviation which the latter rule might occasion
is more than offset by the practical considerations which dictate its
use. In the normal situation the injured party will have engaged
another contractor to complete, and when he shows his actual expense through this contract the courts are not inclined to look further
for the measure of his damages, having already one quite satisfactory
and definite guide which the jury can follow. By disregarding the
former rule, where the owner has actually completed, the necessity
of the generally none too satisfactory expert opinion as to the value
of the property at the time of the breach, and if completed, is obviated. As a result we find the courts prefer the latter rule, and
measure the damages by the cost of completion.
This problem is considerably complicated by the axiomatic duty
of an obligee in a completion bond so to act as to mitigate the loss
of his obligor. No case has actually decided whether it is the duty
of an owner in this situation himself to take every reasonable means
immediately to complete the building, but in such case where the
owner is unable or does not choose to complete himself, the cost may
readily be ascertained by expert testimony, or the court may apply
the "difference in value" measure, either of which, it is submitted,
will lead to the same result.
It should be noted at this time that, in addition to direct damage,
the owner should recover for such damage as falls within the rule of
2 SESmWiCK, op. cit. szpra note I, § 30.

'Elmohar Co. v. People~s Surety Co. of N. Y., 217 N. Y. 289, III N. E.
821 (ii6).
Kinney v. Mass. B. & Ins. Co., 2IO App. Div. 285, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 163
(1921) (the difference between the new cost and the sum unpaid the contractor) ;
Gleason v. Smith, 9 Cush. 484 (Mass. 1852) (the sum necessary to complete
according to the contract); Watters v. London & Lancashire Ind. Co., 76
Pitts. 6o5 (Pa. 1927) (the difference between the contract price and the reason-

able cost of doing the work).
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Hadley v. Baxendale,8 under which recovery may be had for such
consequential damage as:
"may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation
of both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable
result of the breach of it."
This would include the loss of rentals caused by delay or (if it
was in the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was
made) the loss of a resale.
7

Mortgagee-Obligee.
In cases such as the hypothetical situation above outlined where
a mortgagee is the obligee on the completion bond, the courts seem
to have difficulty in applying the rather well settled principle just
considered. The fundamental principle is dear: What pecuniary
amount will place the mortgagee in as good condition with respect to
his mortgage as if the contract had been fulfilled?
What is perhaps the leading case on this subject is Province
Security Corporation v. Maryland Casualty Company,8 recently decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. In that case
the Court said:'
"The measure of damages is to be based on the difference
of the value of the property as security, arising from the failure
to comply with the conditions of the bond."
To the same general effect is Longfellow v. McGregor,0 in which
the law was stated as follows:
"The measure of damages is, as against the surety, the difference at the time of the breach of the bond, between the value of
the mortgaged premises without the house built on them, and
the then amount of the mortgage debt, not exceeding the amount
the rebuilding of the house would have increased the value of the
premises."
It should be pointed out in passing that in both last cited cases
the "completed value" of the buildings would unquestionably have
a9 Ex. 341 (1854).
See also German-American Title & Trust Co. v. Citizen's Trust & Savings

.Co., xgo Pa. 247, 42 Atl. 682 (1899) (bond to holder of ground rent) and
Wheeler v. Equitable Trust Co., 2o6 Pa. 428, 55 Ati. io65 (1903) (mortgagee
of ground rent) for examples of other limited interests protected by completion
bonds.
8 168 N. E. 252 (Mass. 1929).
9Ibid., at 257.
"06i Minn. 494, 497, 63 N. W. io32, io34 (895).
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exceeded the face amount of the mortgage. However, where the
surety is able to prove that the buildings, even if completed, would
not have been of sufficient value to be complete security for the mortgage, recovery should be limited to the actual loss the mortgagee has
suffered from the non-completion, viz.: the difference between the
security value at the time of the breach and the security value of the
completed structure, since what the obligee is protected against is

11
For the same reason, in the
merely loss caused by non-completion.

case of a second or third mortgage, where even the completed building
would have afforded no security, there is no loss to such mortgagees
as a result of the breach and no action will lie on the bond.
If, on the other hand, at the time of the breach the mortgaged
premises have a value then in excess of the face amount of the mortgage held by the obligee of the completion bond, there would clearly
seem to be no loss on the mortgage and no cause of action; 12 notwithstanding that the value of the property is less by reason of the
breach. Whether this seemingly logical conclusion follows in any
particular case depends on the wording of the condition of the bond.
There is nothing to prevent a surety who so desires from adding to
the usual indemnity bond, a condition in the form of an affirmative
covenant to complete. In such a situation the mortgagee himself may
complete, and recover the cost thereof from the surety. 13 The mort-4
gagee may elect not to complete and sue for the cost of completion.
Such a recovery should be held to be in diminution of the mortgage
debt, in which event the practical effect of the covenant would be to
render the bond similar to a mortgage-guaranty bond.
When the mortgagee comes to show his loss by reason of depreciation in the value of his security, the question of how this value
may be determined arises.

In the Province Security Corporation

1
case the lower court, following a dictum of an earlier case, held the
measure of damages to be the difference between the value if completed as contracted for, and the value of the abandoned premises,
as shown by the amount realized at the foreclosure sale.

" See cases supra notes 9 and lo. Weightman v. Union Trust Co., 208 Pa.
449, 57 Atl. 879 (1904). There is also language pointing to this conclusion in
Wheeler v. Equitable Trust Co., supra note 7 and Pennsylvania Co. v. Central
Trust & Savings Co., 255 Pa. 322, 99 Atl. 91o (1917).
12"the plaintiff must show loss to himself as mortgagee, by reason of the
failure . . . to complete the building operation. If he shows no loss . . there
is no breach of the condition of the bond, and, consequently, no right to recover." Weightman v. Union Trust Co., supra note ii, at 451. "If the mortgage, notwithstanding such non-completion was worth its face value, no loss
was sustained." Pennsylvania Co. v. Central Trust & Savings Co., stpra note
II, at 328, 99 At. at 913.
" Equitable Trust Co. v. National Surety Co., 214 Pa. 159, 63 Atl. 699
(19o6).
" Pennsylvania Co. v. Central Trust & Savings Co., supra note ii.
',Norway Plains Savings Bank v. Moors, 134 Mass. 129, 135 (1883).
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The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the lower court and
pointed out that the proper measure of damages was:
"the difference at the time of the breach of the bond, between
the security value of the property as it stood at that time, and
the amount then due on the mortgage, or the value of the building if completed." 16
As thus stated, and as borne out by the other cases, the damage
must be assessed as of the time of the breach.' 7 For this reason,
since the foreclosure sale must occur at some later time, the price
there obtained would not be conclusive in the action on the breach of
the bond, where only the value at the previous date is in issue. The
additional fact that the foreclosure sale is forced should likewise
militate against the conclusiveness of the price there obtained. Excepting the possible case where the mortgagee buys in the property
on the writ for sheriff's costs, this price will be admissible as prima
facie evidence tending to show the value of the property at the earlier
date. 8
The present condition of the law seems to be that the mortgagee
who has foreclosed may show his prima facie loss by proof of the
price successfully bid at a bona fide sheriff's sale. That this is the
acutal value of the property may then be contested by the surety
who may attempt to prove greater value. Conversely, if a mortgagee
forecloses and at the sheriff's sale himself bids the face amount of
the mortgage, it has been quite properly held that he has suffered no
loss by the failure of the surety to complete the building.' 9
A collateral inquiry upon which there seems to be little authority,
and that little in discord, is whether the mortgagee may recover his
foreclosure costs as an element of his damage. In Province Security
Corporation v. Maryland Casualty Co. the court disallowed the
claim '0 pointing out that the bond was not given to secure the payment of the mortgage, but only the completion of the building. In
the absence of any direct expression, which would of course govern,
the problem is largely conjectural, and the decision of the Massachusetts case would seem to be on a sound basis. The same considSupra note 8, at 257 (italics the writer's).
Longfellow v. McGregor, supra note io,at 497, 63 N. W. at 1034;
Kidd v. McCormick, 83 N. Y. 391, 395 (i881) ; German American Title & Trust
Co. v. Citizen's Trust & Savings Co., supra note 7, at 256, 42 Atl. at 683.
" . . . the time for determining these values was the time when the defendant
left the houses, as finished, or as soon afterward as plaintiff had notice of the
defects, or might have had notice by the exercise of reasonable diligence."
Norway Plains Savings Bank v. Moors., supra note 15, at I35.
' Province Security Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra note 9, at 257;
2 SEDGWlCK, op. cit. supra note I, § 243.
"Wheeler v.Equitable Trust Co., 221 Pa. 276, 7o At. 75o (I9O8).
' Supra note 8, at 258.
'

'TSee
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eration would seem to outlaw any claim
by the mortgagee for rents
21
and profits as an element of damage.
Perhaps the most interesting situation arises where a surety,
following a default by the principal, completes the premises in accordance with the plans and specifications and the terms of the contract, except that the completion is late. In such cases, completion
has almost invariably been accomplished with the consent of the mortgagee. To what damage, if any, is the mortgagee entitled as compensation for the delay?
It has been decided that depreciation in the value of the property
due to lapse of time is not an element of damage for which the mortgagee can recover. A fortiori, it should follow that the surety would not be responsible for any impairment to the mortgagee's security caused by a
depression in the real estate market. Such a fortuitous event could
hardly be said to be within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of making-the contract, nor could it be in any way held to be
a consequence of the default. If the bond is merely one for indemnity, and no actual loss can be traced to the delay, it is obvious
that there can be no recovery.2 3 However, assuming that the bond
contains an affirmative covenant to complete, upon the breach the
surety has the alternative duty either to complete the building or to
pay the cost of completion (or difference in value). If the completion is elected and occurs after the time set in the contract and
bond, it would seem that the mortgagee should have some redress.
In the usual case, since the property is the sole asset of the mortgagor to which the mortgagee must look for his interest, it might be
argued that such loss of interest on the mortgage as the delay occasioned would fall within the Hadley v. Baxendale rule. At best this
argument seems very tenuous, and it is doubtful whether a court
would hold such loss to be within the contemplation of the parties
unless specifically set forth. The further consideration that the bond
is not a mortgage-guaranty bond would seem to outlaw such a claim.
It is only where the amount of the mortgage exceeds the cost of
completion that any obligee would attempt such a claim. Granted
that the customary damage allowed by the law for delay is interest
on the obligation, it would seem that (the pecuniary obligation being
the cost of completion) all the recovery, if indeed any, that should
be allowed the mortgagee would be interest on the cost of completion
from the date on which the building was agreed to be finished until
the date on which it actually was finished-the principal amount
being discharged by the actual completion of the building. It is pos21 There is a suggestion to the contrary in the Province Security Co. case,
supra note 8, at 257, but there was no decision since the evidence showed there

was no loss of rent.

Norway Plains Savings Bank v. Moors, supra,note I5, at 136.
See cases supra, note 12.
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sible to imagine a case where completion would be postponed several
years or indefinitely by the refusal of either party to undertake the
work, in which instance the interest would assume great proportions.
In this case if the surety refused to offer compensation as well, he
would have only himself to thank for his predicament. However,
to prevent a situation where the obligee refused to accept tender for
the purpose of practically receiving an annuity from the surety (the
amount being unliquidated a tender would not stay the running of
interest) by waiting until the end of the limitation period to sue, it is
submitted that recovery of interest should be completely denied after
date of tender where the tender was found to be reasonable in the
first instance 24 or that the recovery of interest should be limited to
that period during which the building might reasonably have been
completed. To do otherwise would in effect make the covenant
specifically enforceable, since no surety could afford not to complete.
25
Such a dilemma might be avoided by a limitation clause in the bond..
The law at this time is in a state of early development in this
field and consequently much of the above discussion is purely speculative. Many supposititious cases may be put the answer to which
will not be found in any of the reports. All that can be done at
present is to await the developments from the flood of cases occasioned by the recent depression, and now on the trial lists. It is possible that with the growth of building and frequency of occurrence
of such litigation courts or legislatures may treat them as sui generis
and evolve a special set of rules only applicable to these cases.

MENTAI.

DEFICIENCY

AS

REDUCING

THE

DEGREE

OF

THE

OFFENSE-The doctrine-sometimes referred to as the "doctrine of

partial responsibility" 1 -that mental deficiency may be considered to
determine whether or not the accused had the requisite specific intent
to commit the crime with which he is charged has not found much
favor in the courts of this country.2

At the outset this doctrine

" If it is borne in mind that the interest is allowed as damage and not as
interest, the court might very properly hold in such a case that there was no
damage of this type. It should also be noted that the obligee would be violating
his duty to mitigate his loss.
'Watters v. Fisher, 291 Pa. 311, 139 At. 842 (1927). In the event that
action by the obligee is required early the damages will be assessed at that time
(although the judgment will be for the penal sum of the bond), and tender by
the surety of the sum thus liquidated would effectually stay any further recovery.

' Keedy, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility (1917) 3o HARv. L. REv.
535, 551.
- Weihofen, Partial Insanity and Crimiaul Intent (193o) 24 IL. L. REv.
505. In this article the author says that the rule "has been adopted in only four
or five states, while it has been definitely rejected in twice that number".
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must be carefully distinguished from the customary "right and
wrong" test of insanity.3 If the rule of partial responsibility is applied, it is for the purpose of determining whether the accused had
sufficient mental capacity so that all the elements of the crime with
which he is charged, existed at the time the crime was committed.
Thus, if a statute requires wilfulness, deliberation and premeditation
for a killing to be murder in the first degree, it is necessary that the
killing be wilful, deliberate and premeditated. If the accused at the
time of the commission of the crime was incapable, by reason of
being mentally deficient, of deliberating and premeditating, then,
according to the doctrine of partial responsibility he should not be
convicted of murder in the first degree. However, assuming he was
able to distinguish between right and wrong he should not be acquitted, and would therefore remain guilty of the crime of murder
in the second degree, the elements of which were present when the
crime was committed.
A recent decision in a lower court in Pennsylvania,4 following
earlier Pennsylvania cases 5 absolutely rejected the doctrine. In this
case the defendant had killed his aunt, with whom he lived, by
strangling her with a rope. The testimony of a specialist in mental
diseases was to the effect that the defendant was a mental defective;
that, medically speaking, he was not insane but was feeble-minded,
having the mental capacity of a nine year old child. Others who
knew the defendant testified to the same effect. Counsel for the
defendant contended that because of his mental deficiency he was
incapable of premeditation and deliberation and therefore should not
be convicted of murder in the first degree; yet, since he was not insane
so as to be irresponsible for crime under the test for insanity in
force in Pennsylvania, he was guilty of murder in the second degree.
The court, however, held that the testimony introduced on behalf
of the defendant could not be considered for the purpose of reducing
the grade of the offense from murder in the first degree to murder
in the second degree,' a holding in accord with the great weight of
authority in the United States.7

I People v. Coffman, 24 Cal.

230

(1863); Anderson v. State, 42 Ga. 9

(1871) ; State v. Kotovsky, 74 Mo. 247 (i88i).

' Com. v. Scott, in the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Fayette County

(opinion filed June 17, 1930).
I Corn. v. State, 19o Pa. 138, 42 Atl. 542 (1899) ; Com. v. Barnes, ig Pa.
335, 49 Atl. 6o (19O1) ; Com. v. Cavalier, 284 Pa. 311, 131 Atl. 229 (1925).

'The defendant in this case was later declared insane by a commission and
the case was not appealed.
ICom. v. Cooper, 2I9 Mass. I, io6 N. E. 545 (1914) ; State v. Palmer, 16I
Mo. 152, 61 S. W. 651 (19O1) holding that although the defense is weakmindedness, yet the same test, that of the ability to distinguish right from
wrong in the doing of the particular act, must be applied. State v. Schlops,
78 Mont. 56o, 254 Pac. 858 (1927); Hogue v. State, 65 Tex. 539, 146 S. W.
905 (I912).
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It would seem that one reason why courts do not adopt the
doctrine before stated is that they recognize only one form of mental
affliction, the test for which is the ability to distinguish between right
and wrong. They refuse to see that "there are many degrees both of
sanity and insanify; and that the two states approach each other in
imperceptible gradation, melting into each other, . ..
as day melts
into night".8 These courts set up two categories, into which all cases
must fall, and hold strictly to the view that a man is either wholly
responsible or wholly irresponsible. If he is not wholly irresponsible
then no matter if he be mentally defective he is held to the same
degree of responsibility as a so-called normal person. They proceed on the theory that whenever any question of mentality is introduced as a defense to crime the ordinary test of insanity is to be
applied, and if the defendant was able at the time the crime was
committed to distinguish between right and wrong, he is fully responsible regardless of his mental deficiency.' 0 The attitude of the
majority is expressed in the following language of the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts:
"Criminal responsibility does not depend upon the mental
age of the defendant, nor upon the question whether the mind
of the prisoner is above or below that of the ideal, or of the
average, or of the normal man, but upon the question whether
he knows the difference between right and wrong"."
That one is either wholly responsible or wholly irresponsible
does not seem to correspond with fact. It is rather "to fly in the
face of perfectly patent facts that are in everybody's individual experience and is only comparable to such beliefs of the Middle Ages
that a person is possessed of a devil or is not possessed of a devil,
and therefore is or is not a free moral agent". 2
The doctrine of partial responsibility has been adopted in some
jurisdictions. Probably the most recent case adopting it is People v.
81

WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW ((iith ed. 1912) 85 (italics the writer's).
'State v. Schlops, Hogue v. State, both supra note 7, in the former of which
the court says at page 578, 254 Pac. 858 at 863:
"Protection is always afforded in courts of law to persons of unsound
mind. Distinction is made between sanity and insanity in people, but not
as respects their grade of intelligence. The law does not attempt to measure
degrees of intellect nor to make distinction with respect thereto, where the
power of thought and reason exists."
" Wartena v. State, io5 Ind. 445, 5 N. E. 2o (I885).
' Corn. v. Trippi, I67 N. E. 354, 356 (Mass. 1929).
'WHITE, INSANITY AND THE CmMINAL LAW (1923) 8g.
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Moran," a New York case. But prior to this it had been announced
in other cases.'"
The United States Supreme Court 1 in a case
where the defense was intoxication has stated the doctrine broadly
enough to cover both mental subnormality and intoxication. 6
"When a statute establishing different degrees of murder
requires deliberate premeditation in order to constitute murder
in the first degree, the question whether the accused is in such
17
a condition of mind by reason of drunkenness or otherwise,'
as to be capable of deliberate premeditation, necessarily becomes
a material subject of consideration by the jury."
These cases show that while the majority of jurisdictions have
not adopted the doctrine of partial responsibility it nevertheless has
some very eminent judicial support. A pertinent inquiry is whether
the doctrine should receive more universal favor and on what legal
principles it can be adopted.
It would seem that if the courts but adhered to the fundamental
rule of criminal law, that all the elements of the crime with which
the accused is charged must be present in order to convict, they would
be adopting the doctrine of partial responsibility without question.
If certain fixed elements are required to obtain a conviction in the
2-49 N. Y. 179, i8o, 163 N, E. 553 (1928), in which the court said:
"Feebleness of mind or will, even though not so extreme as to justify
a finding that the defendant is irresponsible, may properly be considered
by the triers of the facts in determining whether a homicide has been
committed with a deliberate and premeditated design to kill, and may thus
be effective to reduce the grade of the offense."
"In a Utah case the doctrine was announced in the following words:
"While the jury found that his [the defendant's] condition in that
respect was not such as to affect his mental capacity to relieve him from
responsibility, yet it may have been such as to effect his mental capacity
to coolly deliberate and premeditate on his acts. The jury, therefore, . . .
should have been instructed to consider all of the foregoing evidence in
determining appellant's mental capacity to deliberate and premeditate the
homicide. While one's mental condition may not excuse the act, it may
nevertheless affect the degree of guilt." State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137,
145, 148 Pac. lO71, lO74 (1915).

An early Connecticut case seems to lay down the same rule:
"If it be conceded that one afflicted with it [moral mania] never loses
the power to distinguish between right and wrong, and is at all times master
of himself and may control his actions, still his mind may be enfeebled
and the power of his will weakened, so that he will readily yield to the
influence of temptation or provocation without that wilful, deliberate and
premeditated malice which is essential to constitute murder in the first
degree. The jury therefore ought to consider moral mania, if satisfied
of its existence, in determining the degree of crime, and give it such weight
as it is fairly entitled to under the circumstances." Anderson v. State, 43
Conn. 514, 526 (1876).
'Hoyt v. People, lO4 U. S. 631, 634 (i88).
"Keedy, op. cit. supra note I, at 552.
"Italics the writer's.
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case of a defendant charged with a certain crime, and any one of
these elements is lacking, as an abstract proposition, most men would
agree that no conviction could be had. But, should the crime charged
include a lesser offense, all of the elements of which are present
without the missing one, the accused should be convicted of this
lesser offense.'
It will be evident that there are persons who are sane and yet
so mentally defective that they are incapable of deliberating upon
whether to act or not, weighing one thing against another and making
a choice. To return to our original example, it has been said that
"to premeditate means to think over, to revolve in the mind, beforehand; that to deliberate means to reflect, to consider, to weigh with
a view to a choice or decision".'0 If, then, such person is incapable
of doing these things, he is incapable of committing a deliberate, premeditated killing and,. therefore, cannot be guilty of murder in the
first degree.2 0 It is for the jury to decide from the evidence whether
or not the defendant had sufficient mental capacity to deliberate and
premeditate. On the basis of this fundamental principle of law it
would seem that the doctrine could be adopted.
The doctrine of partial responsibility has been applied in the
cases of killing where the defense is intoxication. 2 ' In these cases it
is held that if the intoxication is so great as to render the defendant
unable to form a wilful, deliberate and premeditated design to kill
then he cannot be convicted of murder in the first degree but may be
convicted of a lesser offense. 2 But this same principle which is
applied in intoxication cases is not carried over to the cases where the
defense is defective mentality, a condition for which the defendant
is devoid of responsibility. An able and just criticism of such view
is found in the words of the dissenting judge in a New Jersey case: 23
"It is an abhorrent idea to contemplate that in a case of
intoxication resulting, even from the voluntary act of the person,
'People v. Moran, supra note 13; Anderson v. State, supra note I4;
State v. Anselmo, supra note 14.
11State v. Anselmo, supra note 14, at 173, 148 Pac. at o85.
0Note (1922) 13 J. CRrm. L. 300, 301, in which it is said "the inquiry
would be, in regard to murder in the first degree, for example, as sometimes
defined at least was he capable mentally of forming the intent to kill? Was he
capable of doing that wilfully? That is to say, was his mentality sufficient so
that he had the power of volition, including in that probably, the ability to
choose-the element of choice as a psychological element of the will in that
sense? Did ha have mentality sufficient to deliberate upon the act?"
' State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136, 143 (873) ; "Intoxication is admissible in
such cases, hot as an excuse for crime, not in mitigation of punishment, but as
tending to show that the less and not the greater offense was . . . committed."
Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 55 (1862) ; Terrill v. State, 74 Wis. 278, 4

N. W. 243 (889).

Keenan v. Commonwealth, ibid.
' State v. Martin, 1O2

N. J. L. 388, 403, 132 Atl. 93, 99 (925).
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if by reason of such intoxication his mind is in such a state that
he cannot form an intent to take life or to deliberate, or to premeditate, a jury should take that factor into consideration and
may convict him of murder in the second degree, whilst if a
person is afflicted with a mental disease, the act of God, a jury
may not take that factor into consideration on the question of
premeditation, deliberation, wilfulness or intent, and must convict the defendant of murder in the first degree if he fails to
satisfy the jury that his mental condition was such that at the
time of the commission of the act he did not understand the
nature of the act which he was doing, and was unable to distinguish right from wrong."
The same doctrine is applied in cases where the killing is done
under provocation of certain kinds as in "heat of blood". 2 Here,
though the state of mind does not amount to a complete defense, it
may reduce the grade of the offense from murder to manslaughter.
In such cases the law is indulgent "to the frailty of human nature". 2
But the courts do not seem to be so indulgent, although it would seem
that they should be, in the cases where the defense is defective mentality. It is submitted that this doctrine is equally applicable in the
cases where the defense is mental 2subnormality as where the defense
is intoxication or "heat of blood". 0
Another reason which is advanced for the adoption of the
doctrine is that juries would not be as prone to acquit defendants
who have lacked some of the mental elements necessary for the full
crime charged. If the doctrine were adopted juries could then fairly
decide whether or not all the elements of the crime were present and
bring in their verdict accordingly. Under the present practice they
are very likely to acquit in a case where the defendant is not really
insane27 and therefore partly responsible even though deficient mentally.

'Collins v. State, io2 Ark. i8o, 143 S, W. io75 (i9i2) ; Maher v. People,
io Mich. 212 (1862); Com. v. Collandro, 231 Pa. 343, 8o Atl. 571 (91);

Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 2, at 506.
'Maher v. People, ibid. at 219.
' Keedy, op. cit. supra note 1, at 552.
-Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 2, at 512: "If reducing the degree of the
crime is not within the jury's power, they will often acquit a defendant whom the
evidence shows to be "not quite bright" even though the evidence shows that
he is not so insane as to be legally irresponsible. This is especially likely
to happen where the jury's sympathy is with the defendant."
Keedy, op. cit. supra note I, at 554: "the editor suggested that the adoption
of the doctrine of partial responsibility would lead to comprConise verdicts when
the evidence is conflicting. It is submitted that this result is not nearly so
Ikely to happen as is the acquittal, under the present rules, of a defendant who
is shown to have lacked some of the mental element necessary for the full
crime charged. Illogical verdicts are more likely to result from illogical than
from logical rules."
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In conclusion it is submitted that courts should apply the fundamental principles of criminal law, that all the elements of the crime
charged against the defendant must be present in order to convict
him; that they should not refuse to see that there is a distinction
between feeble-mindedness and insanity, in that the former is a lack
of mind or mentality while the latter is a pathological condition of
a developed mind and that, therefore, the rules applicable to the one
should not be applied to the other; that if the doctrine of partial responsibility is applied in homicide cases where the defense is intoxication, a condition of mind into which the defendant voluntarily puts
himself, and where the defense is "heat of blood," another condition
for which the defendant is more or less responsible, it should most
certainly be applied in the cases where the defense is feeble-mindedness, a condition of mind for which the defendant is in no way responsible. Then "a result is reached which not only harmonizes
with sound principle, but is far more consistent with the public idea
of justice than would be a verdict either of not guilty or of murder
in the first degree".2
A.W.B.
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WHARTON,

op. cit. sipra note 8, at 86.

